



BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS 
Louis B. Sohn 
I feel fortunate that I have this 
opportuniLy to talk about human righLs 
and international law, because too often 
people think of international law as 
being purely a law beLween sLates. We 
feel concerned about what the major 
states are going to do to each other, and 
we forget that behind them there are 
thrre biIlion individuals, alJ of them 
worried about their rights and duties. 
What [ wish to give you today is a view 
of international law from below, where 
human beings are asking for help, rather 
than from above, from the 10fLy world 
of states. This is an area of internaLional 
law in which, over the years, we de-
veloped perhaps more law than in other 
areas. If you look at the jurisprudence 
of international tribunals, you discover 
that more eases deal wiLh prohlems of 
human righLs than with rights and duties 
of states themselves. 
There is also another misconception: 
namely, thaL this is a new area of law; 
that realJy this branch of inLernaLional 
law developed in the 19Lh cell LUry as 
part of Llw cenLllry of imperialism; LhaL 
Lhis is the parL of international law 
which the big powers imposed on the 
smalJer ones, espeeialJy on the LaLin 
Americans, and which the West imposed 
on the other parts of the world. 
[f YOll look aL history, YOIl wry ~oon 
discover that this is a misleading theory. 
International law in this area can be 
Lraced very far back to problems be-
tween ciLy-states of Italy, between the 
l\loorish kings and the Christian kings in 
Spain, then between the other powers 
of WesLern Europe: England and 
France, England and the Netherlands, 
and hetween France and Spain. For 
somc reason, many of the cases of LhaL 
period seem Lo involve the Portuguese. 
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Protection of Citizens Abroad. One 
of our first cases-quite well known-is 
the Bernard Dongrasilli case in 1295 in 
which King Edward the First of England 
gave Mr. Dongrasilli permission to en-
gage in privateering against Portugal in 
order to recover the value of plundered 
ships that the Portuguese had taken.! 
And, already in 1295, in the documents 
relating to this case, you find all the 
basic ingredients of the rules of protec-
tion of individual rights in international 
law. First, that it is a right, in fact a 
duty, of a state to protect its subjects. 
Much later this principle was, in a way, 
codified by the eminent Swiss jurist 
Valtel who, in 1758, wrote that 
Whoever ill treats a citizen in-
directly injures the state, which 
must protect that citizen. The 
sovereign of the injured citizen 
must avenge the deed and, if 
possible, force the aggressor to 
give full satisfaction or punish 
him, since otherwise the citizen 
will not obtain 'the chief end of 
civil society, ,~hich is protection. 
Thus Vattel codified what was already 
practiced for the previous 500 years. 
The other factor which the English 
practice recognized in 1295 was that 
both the foreign state and all of its 
subjects were responsible for what the 
state or its citizens had done. The 
procedure to recover damage was then 
as follows. The victim should try to 
obtain a remedy in the local courts; 
secondly, thrre should he diplomatic 
negotiations; and only if these should 
fail, would more forceful means be 
permissible. And then comes the basic 
rule, which, again goes all the way hack 
to the 13th century; and if one should 
search the Italian jurisprudence, one can 
find it evcn in thc lIth century. That 
rule is that if justice i~ denied, a state 
ca.n authori1.c enforcenH'nt action, and 
the action that was authorized in those 
days, interestingly enough, was the use 
of naval force. 
The injured person was authorized to 
equip a ship and go on the high seas and 
find a ship of the other side and capture 
it, hring it back to port, if possible, have 
it sold properly, have the value ascer-
tained and this value deducted from 
what the other country was owing to 
him for a denial of justice. This method 
of issuing special letters of marque and 
reprisal persisted up to at least tlH' 17th 
century in that fashion, hut it later 
became confused with general reprisals 
ordered in wartime and with privateer-
ing which sometimes shaded into piracy. 
All these three things are, howevC'r, 
quite different. Whatl am talking about 
is the limited right of reprisal in order to 
obtain proper compensation for the 
damage a person has suffered. From the 
very beginning this was a right exercised 
by a state to protect its citizens against 
another state, but exercised for a long 
time through the private self-help of the 
individual, who was, however, properly 
authorized to do it by the state. 
In the 17th century, King Charlrs the 
Seeond and, to some extent, Cromwell 
before him, felt it might be safer to use 
the public navy to obtain adequate 
compensation. Of course, as a eompro-
mise at the beginning, both methoels 
were uscd. The injured citizen can go 
out and try to e10 it himself, hut lit the 
same time the government ean authorize: 
the navy to do it as well, and when the 
whole amount is collected, by which-
ever means, the procedure comes to an 
end. There was, of course, a very elabo-
rate system of accounting to ensure that 
the one authorized to engage in reprisals 
did not get too much. Some, neverthe-
less, engaged in private robbery on the 
side, and over the years the danger of 
abuse increased. 
It was only later, in the 18th cen-
tury, at the time of Vattcl whom I have 
mentioned before, that the prot(~cti()n 
of rights of individuals IwcalllCl IlIl1e~h 
more clearly an activity between states, 
and the governments began to use their 
navies to obtain redress for their 
citizrns. Anrl it just happens that this is 
ahout the time that the United States 
came into existence and that for the 
United States, practice mostly has been 
in the second area, though you still find 
in the 1830's treaties concluded by the 
United States with other countries 
l'aying that private reprisals, while nor-
mally prohihited, might he permissihlc 
in some cases, in particular if the other 
party -denies justice. So you still have 
that old rule pcrsisting up to the 19th 
century. And there was, in faet, one 
case in which a person injured was 
trying to get through Congress permis-
sion to obtain letters of marque and 
reprisal in a case against a Latin Ameri-
can country-the Aves Island claim in 
IB57. In that case our Government said 
to the other country: if you fail to 
comply with the rules, if you continue 
to deny justice, we might issue the 
letters of reprisal. Thus this practice 
persisted beyond the middle of the 19th 
century. 
But the practice of the United States 
was mostly of a different kind: to send 
the Navy or the Marines to protect our 
citizens; if necessary to occupy a cus-
toms station or a town in order to get 
hack the property which was taken 
away or to protect the lives of indivi-
duals. The authors disagree ahout the 
number of such cases. Somc say that 
there have been 140 cases, some list 
only 70, others say that there were even 
less than that, that there were 50 or so, 
the other cases heing really cases of 
puhlic action rather than action to 
protect the individual. But in the 19th 
century, and even this one up to the 
1920's, there have certainly been many 
cases in which military forces, in par-
ticular naval forces, have been used in 
order to protect citizens. 
To some extent this practice has 
heen codified in the regulations for the 
governml'nt of the Navy of thc United 
States in ] C) W, and almost the samc 
provision is still in the U.S. Navy Regu-
lations 1948. These regulations prov1de 
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that on occasions ~vherc injury to the 
United States or the citizens thereof is 
committed or threatcned, in violation of 
thc principles of international law or a 
treaty, the senior officer present should 
consult with the diplomatic representa-
tive or consul of the United States and 
should take such steps as the gravity of 
the situation demands. The rcspon-
sibility for action takenby a naval force, 
however, rests wholly upon the com-
manding officer thereof. One easily can 
see the difficult prohlem facing the 
commanding officer. He has to decide 
such a case on the spot; consult with the 
diplomatic officer if possible, but other-
wise he has to decide by himself that 
action is required. In at least one case, 
the Barrundia affair at the beginning of 
the 20th century in Central America, 
the commander of a U.S. war vessel was 
rclieved of his command by the Navy 
Department for action taken under the 
advice of the American Minister in that 
country, when this did not meet with 
the approval of his own superior offi-
cer.2 So a naval commander has to take 
such action on his own risk very often; 
though, of course, now that instant 
communication with naval headquarters 
is possible, that prohlem is less likely to 
anse. 
As a result of this practice, one 
author has said that the American Navy 
had been sent to every quarter of the 
globe to protect life and property of 
fellow citizens, and that American naval 
officers were entrusted with this diplo-
matic task because the; could best unite 
force with persum;ion. 
Professor Buergenthal brought to my 
attention an article hy Colby M. Ches-
ter, entitled "Diplomacy of the Quarter 
Deck, ,04 which was defined as the "neces-
sity to meet the questions of interna-
tional law and rendcr decisions at once 
without time for the mature considera-
tion of diplomatic usage." Such diplo-
macy is (\xerciscd vcry of len on curt 
orders from home governments of the 
naval officer which are restricted to a 
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brief mandate: "Protect American in-
terests, we rely upon your judgment."s 
As naval officers you can see the diffi-
culties which you may face if this 
approach should continue to be neces-
sary. One cannot be surprised that there 
is some reluctance to make the neces-
sary judgments, that there is some 
feeling that it might be dangerous to 
permit such action, the costly mistakes 
have sometimes been made, and that 
some other way should be found for 
dealing with the problem. 
Throughout the 19th century, in a 
parallel way, there developed another 
system of protection of citizens abroad, 
namely through diplomatic action. Pro-
fessor Borchard from Yale wrote a book 
about it in 1915. Later we turned this 
problem around and gave it the name of 
responsibility of states for injuries to 
aliens. The number of precedents, the 
number of both diplomatic cases and 
decisions of arbitral tribunals is really 
tremendous. When Professor Baxter and 
I some time ago started working on this 
question, we were able to prepare a 
draft convention and a short com-
mentary in a few years, hut when we 
started trying to colleel all the interna-
tional practice and put it in some 
systematic fashion, we soon found out 
that in our lifetime we would not have a 
sufficient number of man-years to com-
plete the task. Consequently, the com-
mentary remains, rather disappoint-
ingly, only half completed, but still our 
attempt has shown the tremendous 
scope of the material existing in this 
particular area. 
The normal approach in case of an 
international claim is to try to ohtain, 
first, satisfaction by diplomatic means, 
to persuade the other side to go to an 
arbitral tribunal or to an international 
court, and only as a last resort, perhaps, 
was it permissible to use force. I think 
the mit' probahly was stated Ilt'st, 
though in a limited area, by onl' of the 
Hague Conyt>ntions of 1907-the 
Second Convention, or Porter ·Conven-
tion (so-named after Admiral Porter 
who was instrumental in preparing it). It 
prohibited the use of force for the 
recovery of 'contract debts; but people 
often forget that there is a second 
paragraph to it stating that this prohibi-
tion does not apply if the other party 
concerned refuses to go to arbitration or 
makes the arbitration impossible or 
after the award has been rendered re-
. fuses to execute it. Thus this convention 
is very closely connected with arhitral 
or judicial settlement of disputes and 
applies only if the other party, in good 
faith, participates in arhitration pro-
cedure. If it does not, then, in away, 
the convention permits the use of force 
to obtain the payment of a debt. 
We have thus traced through some 
700 years one of the ways by which 
international law protects individuals, 
but it must be remembered that this 
method is limited to the protection by a 
country of its own citizens who have 
suffered an injury abroad. 
Protection of Minorities. The next 
area in which we started protecting 
individuals was the area of minoritil·s. 
And here, starting with some eases in 
the Balkans in the second half of the 
19th century and then extending 
through very elaborate procedures 
developed hy the League of Nations in 
the interwar period, a special system 
was established for protecting indi-
viduals belonging to minorities-racial, 
national, or religious-especially in 
countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East. In those eases; before the 
League of Nations days, humanitarian 
intervention was used. One has to note, 
however, that there is an important 
difference between humanitarian inter-
vention in this sense and military inter-
vention, sometimes also called humani-
tarian. which is used to pro teet a state's 
I'itizmls abroad. I f you prol!'l:t your 
own dtizens abroad, this is n·ally a case 
simply of self-help, which could be used 
in the past where other prorl'dures of 
international law like arbitration have 
failed, and those rules are suhjecl to lhe 
basic rulcs applicable lo the usc of foree 
in international law, including lhe rules 
which are now embodied in the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
Quite different from that is the true 
procedure of humanitarian intervention 
which was developed by the Concert of 
Europe, originally, I suspect, only to 
protect the minorities within the Ollo-
man Empire; for example, the Lebanese 
case around 1860. Even previously, the 
principal European powers found it 
necessary to protect the Belgians from 
the Dutch, and to protect the Greeks 
from the Turks. You remember when 
the combined navies of Europe defeatcd 
the Turkish Fleet at the Battle of 
Lepanto in 1827. You might say this 
was one case of collective naval inter-
vention. There was also the naval block-
ade of the port of Anlwerp in 1832. 
From this point on throughout the 19th 
century there were ~everal l'ases in 
which the powcrs of Europe authorized 
military or naval action to protect vari-
ous minorities. And some of the deci-
sions, including those relating to three 
eascs just mentioned, were execu ted 
through collective action of the Concert 
of Europe. I t was not simply done by an 
action of a particular state nor was any 
state entitled to takc steps on behalf of 
the Concert of Europe without proper 
prior authorization. 
One of the reasons given for develop-
ing the League of Nations into an 
international institution for the protec-
tion of minorities was to avoid humani-
tarian intervention by individual states. 
Intervention as such was somctimes 
done purely for humanitarian reasons, 
sometimes for hidden political reasons, 
and sometimes resulted in an occupa-
tion of vast territories, in which thcre 
was no withdrawal wlwn thc problem 
was solved. The I.,·aguc·thert·fort· ar~ul'd 
that it is necessary to take it out of the 
hands of the individual states and put it 
into international hands. 
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Protection of ·Peoples' in Colonial 
Territories. Another strand ill this pal-
tl~rn of intcrnational COIIl!Crn for the 
rights of individuals emerged in the area 
of protection of colonial peoples. Be-
ginning in the second half of the 19th 
century-though one could go to the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815 as far as 
cprtain acts such as those relating to 
slavery in Africa were concerned -there 
lUIS been a conseiolls effort to protecl 
the colonial peoples from l:xcl'ssive 
abuse by the Western Powers. Some 
self-restrictive agreements were adopted 
for just this purpose. Under the League 
of Nations they were broadened and put 
u'nder clearer international supervision 
in the so-called mandates system. This 
was later taken over by the United 
Nations and transformed into a trustee-
ship system. And, as you know, the 
United States is a trustee for territories 
in the Pacific that originally belonged to 
Germany and then were put under a 
Japanese mandate. Over the years a 
mantle of protection was devcloped and 
now includes an international commis-
sion to supervise the mandates called 
the Trusteeship Council. J t supervises 
the few remaining areas undl~r tl"U~tce­
ship. carefully reviews reports submiLLed 
by lhe administering authority, hears 
petitions, and even f;ends investigative 
commiLLl!es to ensure thal thl! situations 
described in the report are as reported. 
So we have at least three basic 
strands which can be traced to the 
period before 1945-diplomatic protec-
tion which, in a way, developed from 
tire oldt·r private rcpri~al~ idea and 
which, in turn, merged into the concept 
of the responsibility of states for inju-
ries to aliens; secondly, we have minori-
lies protection, whieh was originally 
connected with humanitarian interven-
tion; and thirdly, we have the trustee-
ship sY8telll which succecdt'd tlH~ man-
dates system. 
Protection of Human Rights by the 
United Nations. When the Charter of 
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the United Nations was drafted in 1945, 
the framers had to take all these pre-
vious developments into account. There 
was also the additional fact that human 
rights .were violated on a gross scale, 
especially by the Nazis, just before and 
during the Second World War. As you 
know, millions of people, not only Jews 
but also people of various Eastern Euro-
pean nationalities, had been massacred. 
That is why there existed in San Fran-
cisco a feeling that it was possiblc to go 
much further in the protection of 
human rights in the new chartcr than we 
went in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. In consequence, provisions re-
quiring the United Nations to promote 
the protection and the observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are scattered throughout the charter, 
and a special commission was estab-
lished on the subject-the Commission 
on Human Rights. 
In fact, there was a strong pressure in 
San Francisco to put a bill of rights into 
the charter itself, and thc. only excuse 
for not doing it was lack of time. It had 
been decided that the conference had to 
end on a certain date, and whatever was 
not drafted hy that date could not be 
included in the charter. But a promise 
was given that one of the first jobs of 
the United Nations would he to produce 
such a hill of rights of a universal scope. 
It soon became obvious that to provide 
a comprehensive international agree-
ment or treaty or covenant on the 
subject was going to take a long time. 
People were impatient; they wanted to 
draft something quickly. To satisfy this 
demand, it was suggestcd that there be 
adopted a {Iniversal Declaration of 
Human Rights hy means of a resolution 
of the General Assembly. This was 
drafted relatively qui~kly and was 
adopted in 1948. I t was a very broad 
document, written in a rather general 
fashion, but it listed in a clear :lIld 
unambiguous ma/llll'r the human rights 
which the Unitt'd Nations promised to 
promote and protect. i\ t the time of its 
adoption it was thought' that this resolu-
tion was purely declaratory in character 
and, like other resolutions of the Gen-
eral Assembly, did not really create any 
binding obligations. However, over the 
years a doctrine was developed that the 
Universal Declaration was really a bind-
ing document. In later documents of a 
similar character-like the declaration 
against colonialism and the declaration 
on racial discrimination-it was said that 
those new declarations and the old ones 
were binding and that states were 
obliged to apply them in good faith. So, 
retroactively, in 1968 a United Nations 
Conference on Human Rights met in 
Teheran and decided that the Universal 
Declaration was meant to be a binding 
document from the very beginning. The 
declaration was subject to various inter-
pretations of speeifie provisions. The 
provisions were vague and general, and, 
as a result, it could be argued in each 
particular case whether any provision of 
the declaration was really applicable. 
Nevertheless, important progrcss thus 
was made in devcloping human rights 
standards of a universal character. 
But progress in this area did not stop 
there. About 20 years or more were 
spent working on two covenants on 
human rights; one on economic and 
cultural social rights, and the oth(~r on 
civil and political rights. The purpose 
was to be more precise, to define more 
exactly the protection to which one is 
entitled, in even more detailed fashion 
than was done in the Constitution of 
the United States. And perhaps for that 
reason the documcnt might ht! less 
perfect bccause the more detailed it 
becomes, the greater is the Iikelihuod of 
introducing some mistakes. If the docu-
ment can be limited to more general 
propositions, one can rely on thc courts 
to find within the broad language of the 
old provision any new details that may 
he needed to meet varying circum-
stances. 
The United Nations emharked on 
this hig enterprise, and the covenants 
were prcpared first hy the Commission 
on Human Rights and then revised by 
the Third Commillce of the Gencral 
Assembly. Each body has gone over 
them carefully, months at a time, and 
finally in 1966 reaehed an agreement on 
thesc very eomprehensivc general docu-
ments. It is not yet in force; it has been 
ratified, interestingly, by two Latin 
American states, Costa Rica and Ecua-
dor-Costa Rica has always been a 
pioncer in this area-and by three Medi-
tcrranean states, Cyprus, Syria, and 
Tunisia; but the big powers are con-
spicuous by their absence. The cove-
nants need 35 ratifications before they 
can come into effect, and it is going to 
take some time before it happens. But 
evcrybody feel.s that sooner or later the 
United States and other big powers will 
be faced by the fact that the covenants 
are in force, and if they do not ratify 
them, they will be considered, in a way, 
pariahs of the world community. 
The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provides for certain enforcement 
machinery, though it is rather weak. It 
providcs simply for a committee to 
which each state is obliged to present 
reports. Nevertheless, in some interna-
tional organizations-such as the Inter-
national Labor Organization where 
some more than 100 conventions on 
labor problems havc been ado(lted-
these reports provide a very good pic-
turc of the existing situation and pro-
vide a basis for evaluating what might be 
going on in a particular state, and for 
trying to push them to do better in the 
future. 1\10st states do not like to be 
criticized ycar aftcr year, and under the 
pressure of public opinion they mend 
their ways as Soon as public discussion 
of their reports shows conditions exist 
that are not acceptable. 
I n addition, the Covenant of Civil 
and Political Rights provides that sllites 
may agrc(~ that in ca~e of a disput(~ 
about an nllcgcd violation of thc cove-
nant by one state, another state can file 
a complaint, or they call it simply a 
593 
"comlllunication," with the eOlllllliLLce. 
The committec can eithcr itself deal 
with the mattcr or appoint a special 
conciliation commiLlee to study the 
case in detail, to find, if possible, an 
amicable solution, and to prescnt a 
report on the facts and possibilities of 
settling the mattcr. Relying again on 
pressurc of public opinion, it may he 
hoped that thc state concerned will 
ac(~ept the suggcstions of thc cOlll\llittre 
l)(~forc its noncompliance is puhlicly 
exposed. There is, finally, an additional 
optional protocol which provides for 
the right of individuals to approach th~ 
committee. This is necessary because 
experience shows that states are very 
reluctant-unless they have special po-
litical interests such as those of Austria 
in the case of the Bolzano region of 
Italy or those of Greece with respect to 
Cyprus-to bring a case before an inter-
national body against another state. As 
one State Department official once ex-
plained to me, either the state is 
friendly and we do not want to jeopar-
dize our friendship by submiLling a case 
against it, or the state is unfriendly and 
we do not want to cause further de-
terioration in our relations with it. So 
whichever way you look at it, thcre is 
always a good excuse not to take any 
action. Therefore, it is fclt that unless 
the individual cone(~rn(:d can eOlllplain 
and take it out of the area of being a 
dispute between states, you are not 
going to get very far for a long time. 
That such a procedure is possible is 
proven by the European experience. 
Protection of Human Rights in Eu-
rope and the Americas. TI\(~ Europ(!ans 
first took a step of providing not only 
for a European body, the Council of 
Europe, composed of government dele-
gates, but also for a European consulta-
tive assembly composed of members of 
nalional parlianwnts. The assembly very 
SOOIl started pushing lhe governments 
by arguing that, as European states are 
dedicated to human rights, they ought 
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to have a convention spelling out those 
rights in detail and providing machinery 
for seeing to it that everybody follows 
the rules. For a few years ·the big 
countries and the governments in gen-
eral were resisting the pressure, hut 
even tually the parliamentarians caused 
so much commotion in the council and 
in the national parliaments that the 
Council of Ministers had to agree on 
something. On the basis of a draft 
prepared largely hy the parliamentary 
assembly itself, a European Convention 
on Human Rights was written. Again, it 
was said, that is nice, you have got a 
convention, hut who is going to ratify 
it? Slowly but surely, starting with the 
small states, everybody ratified it except 
France, which had Algeria as the excuse 
at that time. Later, after the loss of this 
excuse, France somehow forgot to 
ratify the convention, though several 
Frenchmen played a major role in its 
preparation. 
But apart from that, sevcral othcr 
European countries wcnt even furthl'r. 
The convention, in addition to defining 
the rights, had an optional provision for 
the right of individU<Jls to bring com-
plaints. A{!;ain people said, which state is 
going to be so crazy to agree to somc-
thing like this? Again, some small states 
were the first, then Germany, and fi-
nally, 2 years ago, even the United 
Kingdom agreed to do it. [taly is faced 
by a similar decision, because until now 
she has always had the excuse that she 
could not do it as long as the British had 
not ratified this optional clause. Now 
that the British have accepted the right 
of individuals to file complaints, Italy 
has lost her excuse. But, still, Italy is 
not alone, as six other European coun-
tries have not yet accepted this clause. 
On the other hand, those that have done 
so have discovered that, while they have 
always applied the basic principles of 
human rights, tht're have been a few 
an~as of law in which they w('re rt'ally 
not up to par. For instance, the British 
discovered that their immigration pro-
cedures did not provide any proper 
administrative revie,\ of the decisions of 
the inspectors about admission of aliens 
and their families. The Germans and the 
Austrians found that soine of their 
criminal law procedures did not comply 
with the standards of the convention; 
and similar weaknesses were found in 
other countrics. Thus even in countrics 
which have always been considered as 
the leaders in the protection of human 
rights, some shortcomings were dis-
covered, and they were only corrected 
when the people concerned were given 
the right to petition the international 
commission. 
Many of the cases before the Euro-
pean Commission were dismissed on the 
ground that there was a failure Lo 
exhaust local remedies available in na-
tional courts or that there was really no 
denial of justice hy a statc. SLiIl, l\ 
number of cases were decided by the 
commission, and a few of them were 
even sent to a European Court of 
Human Rights. This court was alga only 
optional, but, after a while, t'nough 
stall's accepted it so a numhcr of cases 
could be submitted to it, includin~ a 
very important one about linguistic 
problcms in Belgium. There were also 
some eases relating to particular indivi-
duals, involving, for instance, the length 
of detention in Germany and Austria 
pending trial. The European Court 
found in one case that the detention, 
though prolonged, was justified, hut in 
the other case, that the detention was 
not justified. 
So, what we now have is living proof 
that such decisions are not only pos-
sible, hut are acceptable to the stutes. 
Once the right of petition is accepted, it 
works in practice pretty well, and there 
is no reason really for a state to fear it. 
In the Americas we have an Inter-
American Commission on Human 
Rights with very limited jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, after a p(~riod of time it 
was able to arrogate to itsdf certain 
powers, and it proved to be useful in the 
Dominican Repuhlic. Now we are pre-
paring a more elaborate convention on 
human rights for the Amcricas and, in 
addition, there are proposals for a com-
mission and even a court. 
Protection of Human Rights of Mili-
tary Personnel. Provisions on human 
rights am also contained in those parts 
of international law which are of speciill 
interest to the military. The Status of 
Forces Agreements, ('speeially the 
NATO Agreement ill article 7, para-
graph 9, contain a small codification of 
human righLs for the benefit of armed 
forces auroad. The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions on the laws of war, pris-
on('rs of war, rights of civilians in 
oecupi('d t('rritories, ('t ('ctera, ulso con-
tain human righLs provisions. Some of 
l\lI'm have been, of course, enforced lIy 
national courts, hut tlll'm huve been also 
international tribunals, especially at 
Nun!mherg and Tokyo. The United Na-
tions has prepared, though it is not yet 
in force, a code of off('nses against the 
peace and s('curity of mankind which 
tries to codify tIll' Nurembt·rg and 
Tokyo cxperience. Also, a special inter-
national criminal court has bcen pro-
pos('d, and a statute of it has been 
draftcd by the United Nations. 
Thus ;ve can sec that in several arcas 
of international law wc have had trt~­
mendous developments since 1945. The 
canard that individuals are not subjects 
of international law no longer has any 
basis. It is generally accepted that incli-
viduals now have clear rights under 
international law and various n~medies 
to secum their ohservilllee. On the oth/~r 
hand, they arc responf'ible personally 
for violations of international law, as 
some Germans and Japanese discovered 
after the war. 
Human Rights in Southern Africa. I 
hav!' tried to paint. up to this point, thl! 
positiVI' developments. Of course, we 
have also some skeletons in our closets 
here, and mostly they are scaLlered 
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around southern Africa. First, we have 
the violations of human rights in South 
A friea itself that have persisted since 
I <J4(,_ The problem is racial scgregation, 
in particular apartheid, which now has 
been det:lared hy tht~ General Assembly 
to IJC a crime against humanity. At the 
present time the United Nations is 
working on the possibility of a pro-
eedure that would deal with these al-
leged criminals, who praeLil~ed upart-
Iwid, if they can be caught outside of 
South Africa. . 
Southern Rhodesia is involved in a 
similar problem to some extent. How-
ever, it is complicated by thc fact that it 
was a colonial territory which, theoreti-
cally. is still under the jurisdiction of 
thl! Unitrd Kingdom. Tlll~ Unitcd Na-
tions adopLs a re[-;olution every so oftcn 
advising the United Kingdom that it 
l'hould srnd a military force there to 
restore democracy and tlw principle of 
"one person, one vote" and to abolish 
their constitution and impose a much 
better one upon them. Here is a case in 
whil'h the United Nntibns is encour%ring 
Western imperinlism in a part of Africa 
for the benefit of Africans. 
The ncxt case is a cnse of South-Wcst 
Africa. It was a mandate of South 
A frica under the League, it was never 
transformcd into a trustceship, and we 
have had u dispute goin{! on with reaped 
to it bctween the United Nations and 
South Africa since 1945. What is the 
status of South-West Africa, and can the 
United Nations, as successor of the 
Leugue, do anything ahout it? There 
have bcen some opinions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice thnt the United 
Nations is the suecessor and is entitled 
to supervision of the mandate in place 
of the League. 
We have also had a particular dispute 
(you might call it a case of humanitarian 
intervention), in which Ethiopia and 
Lilwria brought a case before the Inter-
national Court of Justice against South 
Africa. This rase was dismisscd finally 
by the Court after a checkered career on 
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the ground that Liheria and Ethiopia 
really had no right to complain to the 
Court about how South Africa trcats 
peopl(' in South-West Africa. The Court 
held that if the two complaining states 
could have shown that their own in-
terests were; involved, that issue could 
possibly have been brought before the 
Court, but as presented, the case was 
not within the Court's jurisdiction. This 
decision naturally offended all the Afri-
can countries very much, and they 
claimed that this demonstrated thal this 
was a Western-dominated Court, that it 
is not going to protect African interests, 
and that something else will have to be 
done. 
As a result the Afro-Asian group 
pushed a resolution through the United 
Nations terminating the mandate of 
South Africa over South-West Africa, 
appointing a special commission to take 
charge of it and a commissioner to 
administcr it, and ordered South Africa 
to deliver the mandatc to them. South 
Africa replied that this was all com-
pletely illegal and that she would not 
comply with the resolution. The com-
mission tried to get into South-West 
Africa a few Limes buL was refused 
entry. No attempt was made Lo Lry Lo 
force the issue, or to visit in South-West 
Africa without SouLh Africa's permis-
sion. 
In view of this crisis, the General 
Assembly has adopted many resolu-
tions. The SecuriLy Council has also 
adopted resoluLions criticizing South 
Africa and has ordered members of the 
United Nations to do something about 
it. There is a very interesting provision 
in one of the resolutions of the Security 
Council calling upon all sLates to in-
crease their moral and material assis-
tance to the peopll' of Namibia (this is 
the new name of South-West A frica) in 
their struggle against foreign occupa-
tion. (Security COli neil rt'solution 2()'J 
(L 9(9).) Some of the rt~solutions of the 
General Assemhly against Southern 
Rhodesia and Portugal are even more 
explicit, as they ask all states to help the 
rehels against the Governments of those 
eountries. 
The last area of Southern Africa with 
which I will deal is the Portuguese 
colonies. Portugal eontends that it does 
not have any colonies, that the ar('as are 
not subject to any supervision or the 
United Nations because they are simply 
African provinces of Portugal, and the 
inhabitants of those colo nics have 
exactly thc same rights as citizens of 
Portugal. The United Nations claims 
that they are colonies, that Portugal is 
accountable to the United Nations, that 
they are subject to the declaration 
about anticolonialism which is sup-
posedly binding on all members, and, as 
a result, Portugal is violating the charter 
by not providing self-determination for 
these colonies. 
To enforce its decision, the General 
Asscmbly _ has recommended economic 
sanctions against these three countries 
controlling southern Africa. However, 
the only economic sanctions against. 
that part of the world that have been 
actually enacted are those against 
Southern Rhodesia. There is a binding 
d(~cision of (he Security Council on (he 
Southern Rhodesian sanctions, and the 
Government of the United States, by an 
l~xeeutive order, has enact(·u those sanc-
tions as hinding on all the citizens of tIll! 
United SLates: 
This is where the story ends for tlHl 
momenL hut, of course, tlu:re still cxist 
some very important problem areas. 
How much further can we go in thc area 
of human rights? h, it eurrl'ntly possih!t~ 
to provide for further enforcement of 
human rights? Should there be de-
veloped the old concept of humani-
tarian intervention into a new concept 
of intervcntion by the United Nations 
or by a regional organization under the 
aUl'pices of the United Nations in l'ases 
wlwre ,this is required'? Tlu! isslu's in-
volved here can be shown best in the 
so-called second Congo case which is 
mentioned in Professor Lillich's arLicle.6 
I n this instance thl' United Stales pro-
vided transportation for Belgian para-
troops going to Stanleyville in order to 
resr.ue a group of Americans and Euro-
peans and some Congolese, who were 
threatened with death by a group of 
Congolese rehds_ I n the pror.ess of 
rescuing them, the army of the rebellion 
was more or less destroyed, hut that was 
purely incidental. Nevertheless, this 
caused a tremendous uproar in Africa. 
The Organization of African Unity 
adopted a strong resolution against it, 
and the Mrican states went to the United 
Nations and got the Security Council to 
adopt a resolution condemning this kind 
of intervention, despite its humanitarian 
character, and asked the Organization of 
Mrican Unity to take such further action 
as may be necessary. 
So you have here the end of the old 
rule and the beginning of the new: that 
even in the most justifiable cases, there 
should no longer 1)(' intervention by 
individual states; that it is the purpose 
of the Charter of the United Nations, of 
the various proccdures developed under 
tht' charter, to take collcctive action on 
behalf of the world community and in 
tht' name of mankind whenever it is 
required; and that no state can intervene 
by itself on the hasis of its own judg-
ment. Perhaps this is a wish that goes 
heyond the realities and that we have 
gone too far in tryin~ to aholish the old 
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before the new is really firmly in place_ 
I suppose the best remedy for this 
problem would be not to try to con-
tinue to operate und('r past rules but to 
try to make the new conc('pts work 
better and more quickly. To this ('nd we 
should try to develop more efficient 
means for the United Nations to do the 
job that needs to be done in such cases 
rather than try to hamper the work of 
the United Nations in this area. There-
fore, in this coming 25th year of the 
United Nations, one of the topics that 
might he hefore it is to make this area 
of international protection of human 
rights more effectivc through strength-
(,ning the power of the United Nations. 
That is the power to effectively deal 
with problems and in this way relieve 
the states, especially the big powers, of 
the very difficult task of deciding 
whether to take action on their own and 
to run into the kind of difficulty that 
the United States ran into in the Do-
minican Republic or which faced the 
joint action by the United States and 
Belgium in the Congo_ So it is not really 
taking an important privilege away from 
the big powers, but it is a means for 
relieving them of a hurden which they 
should not have to shoulder and which 
they have no desire to shoulder any-
more. If we can find a more effective 
means, f:O much the better for them and 
for mankind. 
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